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ESSAY: 
CONVENTIONS IN SCIENCE AND IN THE 
COURTS:  
IMAGES AND REALITIES 
JEROME R. RAVETZ* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The source of our difficulties with “conventions in law and science” is 
related to images. Practice as experienced in the law contrasts with conventions 
accepted in science. The difficulties in applying science in the law are commonly 
explained in terms of the differences in conventions,1 but to some significant 
extent they are the result of the images by which those differences are 
identified. By clarifying these differences, we can perhaps leave aside those 
places where the differences are only apparent and concentrate instead on those 
where real differences do exist and cause real difficulties. 
II 
IMAGES OF SCIENCE 
The image of forensic practice described in the Guidelines is no doubt 
broadly correct.2 After all, the Guidelines image is related directly to the 
difficulties experienced in the ordinary work of the courts. But the image of 
science invoked here is quite otherwise. It is derived from a certain portrait of 
science as an essentially gentlemanly, honorable pursuit, whose conventions 
ensure unfailing courtesy and goodwill. Now, that portrait, which is derived 
from a traditional self-image of science, is also born of experience. But that 
traditional self-image of science was not the outcome of an empirical social-
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 1. See, e.g., Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy Project, Guidelines for the Fourth Coronado 
Conference 2007 (“In the scientific context it is customary (‘conventional’) to discuss the many sides of 
the issue, often in a stylized ‘on the one hand, on the other hand’ manner. On the witness stand, by 
contrast, the scientist is encouraged, almost required, to present one side, leaving the experts on the 
opposing side to present ‘on the other hand.’”) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 2. See id. (describing scientific practice as including stylized “on the one hand, on the other hand” 
debate with disagreement between scientists based on substance). 
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science enquiry. It resulted rather more from an exercise analogous to 
propaganda that arose largely from what was once eloquently described as 
“"the warfare of science with theology in Christendom.”3 In the opening line of 
the classic radical analysis of scientific practice, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn spoke of the “image of science by which we are now 
possessed.”4 For him, this image was largely a fabrication for which previous 
generations of historians were responsible.5 
This is not the place to analyze that image, its history, and its consequences. 
But it does recall the image of classical Athenian society (democratic, open, and 
engaged) as portrayed in Pericles’ 431 B.C. funeral orations.6 That Periclean 
image, too, was rooted in genuine, lived experience and it also served as a 
source of idealism, both for Pericles’ contemporaries and then for those born 
millennia later. But when taken as an objective description of Athenian society 
for the purpose of later scholarly analysis, that image was seriously defective 
and misleading. 
This revealing history of an image is relevant here. It can perhaps help sort 
out some of the difficulties of science in legal settings that have brought us to 
the discussion addressed in this symposium and that will require adjusting and 
modernizing the image of science and its conventions. By examining some of 
the varieties of scientific practice, defined in terms of the function of their 
products, we can place the forensic practice—its context and functions—as just 
one among many. Of course, it has its characteristic features and its points of 
tension and conflict with the others. But by means of such an analysis we can 
escape from the supposedly unbridgeable chasm between two utterly different 
sorts of conventions and forms of practice. 
A. Varieties of Scientific Experience 
This analysis is not intended to be at all definitive or refined. Its goal is only 
to establish a useful point. The analysis starts with the “iconic” sort of science—
pure or basic research. Just to be clear about fundamentals: even this sort of 
research does not consist of “discovering facts” as if they were the pebbles that 
Sir Isaac Newton famously imagined himself picking up on the beach.7 Of 
course, discovery is there, and indeed is at the core. But the actual work consists 
of setting and investigating problems, in the form of hypotheses that are more 
or less formalized, about some aspect of the workings of the world out there 
under study. Now, what makes this sort of work “pure” is that, in an important 
sense, its productions do not matter. That is, the function of the activity is 
 
 3. ANDREW D. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN 
CHRISTENDOM (George Brazille 1955) (1896). 
 4. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1 (2d ed. 1996). 
 5. Id. 
 6. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 120–28 (Richard Crawley trans., 1876). 
 7. DAVID BREWSTER, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND DISCOVERIES OF SIR ISAAC 
NEWTON 407 (1855). 
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internally oriented. The work is designed to produce more knowledge of the 
same sort as that on which it is based. 
This internal orientation produces various tensions with the outside world. 
In particular, those who support the work need to be convinced that it is 
worthwhile in spite of not delivering the sorts of returns that are customary in 
business or statecraft. But, in other ways, that purity provides a liberation from 
the pressures and constraints of the ordinary world. Indeed, some eminent 
scientists of earlier times imagined that pure research was almost another realm 
of existence, far removed from the corruptions of ordinary life.8 
That idealistic, perhaps idealized or “Periclean,” self-image performed a 
variety of important functions, including the shaping and justification of special 
norms of behavior. I have argued that, in the absence of external sources of 
quality assurance, pure science has needed such norms to motivate scientists to 
do well in their work and to do good in their social practice.9 The norms were 
expressed (as idealized) in Robert K. Merton’s classic formulation as “the 
affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on 
scientists.”10 The relationship of these norms as formulated by Merton to the 
explicit beliefs of scientists, pure or otherwise, was never entirely 
straightforward. Although a distinguished sociologist, Merton did not claim that 
his list of norms was the distillation of empirical survey work; much of his later 
work was devoted to showing how scientists actually behave as humans rather 
than as plaster saints.11 
The Mertonian norms of pure science have had one important negative 
effect: they served to reinforce the preciousness, one might even say snobbery, 
of those university scientists who enjoyed lifetime tenure in an undemanding 
daytime job, with encouragement and resources to pursue their hobby in 
research.12 It is not surprising that many of them believed that this good fortune 
was theirs by right and that those whose occupation was more directly related to 
the outside world were in some ways either traitors or prostitutes. Since the 
occupation of “pure scientist” is of extremely recent origin in the social history 
of science,13 this view was really rather parochial; but for a couple of generations 
it was quite powerful in forming the consciousness of scientists and of analysts 
 
 8. See JEROME R. RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 32 (1971) 
(quoting physicist Pytor Kapitsa’s observation that science has lost her freedom and is now an enslaved 
productive force). 
 9. Id. at 273–88. 
 10. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 268–69 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56, 56–63 (1968). 
 12. See STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC LIFE 213 (2008) (“[R]esearch universities increasingly 
offered themselves as handmaids to industry [in the second half of the twentieth century]; helping 
industry was identified as public service; and the sorts of professional commercial ties that were once a 
source of administrative unease were now enthusiastically encouraged.”). 
 13. See RAVETZ, supra note 8, at 37–44. 
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of science.14 There was simply no other story that told scientists who they were. 
But we can escape from the “Mertonian” cage by realizing that the combined 
societal tasks of the advancement of knowledge and protection of intellectual 
property were recognized and managed long before the ideals of “pure science” 
were dreamed of. 
In spite of their being largely ignored by historians and propagandists, some 
very important scientific-research labs have always had goals in the service of 
industry. Part of the power of late nineteenth-century Germany lay in its 
“Kaiser Wilhelm” establishments, where the best research scientists 
collaborated with more practically oriented colleagues in the advancement of 
technology.15 Early in the twentieth century, the great U.S. labs of invention, 
started by Edison16 and continued by the labs of General Electric17 and Bell 
Telephone,18 produced industry-oriented research and invention of the highest 
quality.19 Their elite scientists worked on both “pure” and “applied” projects—
the former yielding contributions to a branch of “the republic of letters” and the 
latter contributing to the profitable work of their employers.20 The forms of 
intellectual property were correspondingly distinct: on one hand, there were 
open publications drawing “rent” in the form of citations, and, on the other, 
trade secrets and patents, intellectual property to be utilized or marketed to 
best advantage. In such cases the governing norms are a mixture of those 
applying to any functionary in a bureaucracy (of which the character will lie 
somewhere on the spectrum between the images defined by Max Weber21 and 
by Franz Kafka),22 together with those of any specialist, learned-professional 
group. Of course there will be conflicts between the two roles and plenty of 
opportunities for corruption; but experience shows that such norms can, in spite 
of their lack of inspirational statements, work adequately. 
Another important sort of science is developed within the systems of state 
regulation. Here again is “mission-oriented science,” but within rather tighter 
constraints even than in industry. For in this case the categories in which the 
work is done are set to a great degree by legislation, rather than (as in the 
“pure” case) by the possibilities of successfully exploring Nature or (as in the 
“applied” case) by the possibility of developing a useful device. Regulation is 
 
 14. Id. (discussing the period in the late 1900s when universities began to take a greater role in 
industry science, thereby increasing the number of “applied” scientists and decreasing the number of 
“pure” scientists). 
 15. JAMES RETALLACK, GERMANY IN THE AGE OF KAISER WILLHELM II 64–65 (1996). 
 16. JOHN WINTHROP HAMMOND, MEN AND VOLTS 20–24 (1941). 
 17. Id. at 314–15. 
 18. SHAPIN, supra note 12, at 94–95. 
 19. RETALLACK, supra note 15, at 20–24; HAMMOND, supra note 16, at 315. 
 20. Wikipedia.org, Republic of Letters, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Letters (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 21. Wikipedia.org, Bureaucracy: Max Weber, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureaucracy#Max_We 
ber (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 22. FRANKZ KAFKA, THE CASTLE (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1974); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 
(Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1986). 
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about activities that interact, possibly harmfully, with their total social and 
natural environment. These interactions are complex, and, in order that 
regulations may be successfully framed and enforced, some aspects of that 
reality must be made salient and simple and the others neglected. 
In the case of public-service bureaucracies, the norms are in some ways 
more demanding and perhaps analogous to those of pure science since the 
simple quantitative criteria of profit are not available (except when created 
artificially by imposed, internal accounting systems). In such cases, the norms 
have come to include a justification for whistle-blowing in recognition of the 
severe conflicts of principle encountered when an employee recognizes 
corruption that the institution tolerates or fosters. 
To take a very simple example of regulatory science, in considering “safety” 
on the road, legislation (and the accompanying research) may focus on risks to 
those inside the cars. Regulators may conduct research-and-development work 
on belts and other restraining devices to keep people from bouncing around 
inside their cars in the event of a crash. But this may well involve neglecting 
those who get hit by the cars and whose risks might even be higher because the 
drivers of the better-equipped cars might feel safer and hence go faster! Also 
(and this point hardly needs stressing for a U.S. audience), the results of 
regulatory research can have implications for the severity of regulation to be 
imposed and, hence, for the costs of operation of those being regulated. We 
have quite enough evidence that those who are being regulated will try to 
“regulate the regulators” and with them their scientists.23 In this sort of science 
we are a long way from Our Town. 
Further, quite a bit of scientific research is done directly in connection with 
legal processes. Most obviously in tort cases involving damage, due diligence, 
and liability, much will depend on scientific information that is tailored to the 
needs of the case. Here the “conventional” restraints are even more severe than 
in the case of regulation, for the legal framework of the cases can be quite 
convoluted.24 Hence, the research has little resemblance to the free exploration 
that characterizes traditional, “pure” science. Moreover, the whole process can 
be protected under “lawyer–client confidentiality,” so that even the very 
existence of the research can be protected from outside view. Of course, this 
feature is not unique; military research is similarly protected. But here, in the 
civil sector, it is a sizeable example of tightly designed intellectual property of 
the most rigidly constrained sort. 
The sort of science that has the most affinities to the legal process is that fed 
into policy. For a long time until recently, this form of practice suffered from 
the illusion of a total separation between science and policy. In the dominant 
U.S. image, the scientists provided the objective facts, the policymakers filtered 
them through their value commitments, and out came policy. The experience of 
 
 23. E.g., CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 102–20 (2005). 
 24. SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON 233–64 (2003). 
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the George W. Bush Administration was very educational, in that now we all 
know about the full cycle of scientific advice.25 This starts with the prioritizing of 
the issue and the choice of persons, then the framing of the problem, through to 
the adoption of appropriate methods, and finally to the control of the output. 
We have learned by example how, at every phase of this cycle, the process can 
be manipulated and corrupted. To use the terms “objective” and “factual” for 
its products may sometimes be more of a courtesy than a description. 
Even when the game is played straight, there are significant problems of 
communication, or translation, between the two realms of science and policy. In 
particular, scientists must learn how to express their judgments of uncertainty 
and quality, for these can be quite crucial in what is understood by their 
audiences. Although the work of policy-relevant science can still be quite 
distinct from the decisionmaking itself (as opposed to in the courts), still there is 
an interaction between the two sides. This area has been well analyzed by 
Roger A. Pielke, Jr., with his key concept of “stealth advocacy.”26 Recognizing 
the problem of communication in this other sphere can prepare one for 
understanding courtroom practice, such as when the scientist is hired as an 
expert witness, ostensibly neutral, but really there to strengthen his client’s case. 
Another strong similarity between policy-related science and the courts is 
made evident by contrasting the other forms of scientific practice. Research 
science has well been called “the art of the soluble.”27 Research scientists have 
the luxury of being able to wait until a field has sufficiently matured technically 
to engage on the exploration of a particular topic. To rush in prematurely is a 
sign of bad strategy. In other sorts of science, that luxury does not exist. In 
technological development, meeting competition in either the civil or the 
military sphere, one must make do with what can be done within tight 
constraints of time and resources, perhaps even adopting a policy of “third 
best.” On occasion, this can lead to confusion and resentment among traditional 
scientists, who believe that their calling permits only the highest standards of 
technical quality. One such incident occurred in the Netherlands, and caused a 
scandal that reverberated for many months.28 
Finally, there is that large and essential sector of science: teaching and 
training. Of course, one could not expect the community of researchers to be 
reproduced exactly among those immature students and overworked teachers. 
However, what we find there is a social practice in which conventions of 
dialogue and openness are, if remembered at all, a bad joke. Up to now, the 
teaching of science has remained the most authoritarian and dogmatic activity 
 
 25. See MOONEY, supra note 23, at 17–24. 
 26. ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND 
POLITICS 3 (2007). 
 27. P.B. Medawar, Koestler’s Theory of the Creative Art, NEW STATESMAN, June 19, 1964, 
reprinted in 67 NEW STATESMAN: THE WEEK-END REVIEW 950 (1964). 
 28. Jeroen van der Slujis, A Way Out of the Credibility Crisis of Models Used in Integrated 
Environmental Assessment, 34 FUTURES 133, 133–37 (2002). 
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in our intellectual culture. Over the years, students learn by the example that 
for every problem there is just one and only one solution, the correct one that is 
found in the answers at the end of the textbook. One does not argue with the 
teacher. It is very hard to find a science exam with the sorts of questions 
common in social science and humanities subjects, like “compare and contrast” 
or “critically examine.” 
For those practitioners who really know, science is a gloriously messy 
business, where things at the exciting research fronts are totally insecure in 
nearly every way and where the different sorts of scientific communities solve 
their communal problems imperfectly but still (we hope) well enough. The 
conventions of discourse in science vary enormously, of course. But the typical 
scientific paper is one of advocacy, wherein objections and difficulties are 
managed en passant as they are being solved rather than being paraded in an 
evenhanded way. Debates between scientists are of course more objective and 
impersonal when the stakes are lower or the fields more settled; but otherwise it 
is only natural for a scientist to doubt the mental and moral capacities of an 
adversary who refuses to see the obvious truth of “My Theory.” The published 
research literature does not usually function as the archive for such personal 
campaigns; their traces will be found in published review articles or in private 
reports evaluating project proposals or papers for publication. 
The purpose of this rather extended discussion is to establish a continuity in 
several dimensions between the various conventions of scientific discourse and 
that of the courts. The real differences will thus be seen as relating to a family of 
scientific practices, rather than as defining an utterly different realm of action 
and discourse. 
Only a minority of the social roles occupied by scientists are “pure” in either 
sense (that is, totally distinct from any other or uncontaminated by practical 
concerns). Plurality of roles, and possible conflict between their respective 
norms, is the condition of life of a scientist (other than a research technician) in 
the contemporary world. Of course such complex situations are the breeding 
ground for corruption, since the grey areas that lead into corrupt practices are 
not fenced off by simple rules. It is possible that someone could formulate a set 
of universal norms that would apply to the pursuit and application of 
knowledge in all circumstances, but that is beyond the present task. Still, during 
any such exploration, the traditional scientists’ goal of the pursuit of truth 
would need to be adapted to include the maintenance of quality. This attribute 
is sufficiently broad to encompass all the areas of practice and sufficiently 
complex to comprehend the variety and conflicts among those practices. If I 
were to embark on discussing the ideals that should motivate the behavior of 
scientists, I would argue that objectivity is now as obsolete as truth, and that in 
its place we should cultivate “integrity.”29 
 
 29. JEROME R. RAVETZ, THE NO-NONSENSE GUIDE TO SCIENCE 61–77 (2006). 
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B. On the Bridge: Expertise in the Courts 
Now to the most contentious element in the whole scene of science in the 
courts: the experts. The clarifications introduced so far can also be useful in 
improving our understanding of these special problems. First, a distinction must 
be made between two very different sorts of practice employed under the same 
name. The great majority of cases involve “research-science expertise.” 
Typically, a person who is knowledgeable and skilled in a particular area of 
research will be called on to offer an opinion on a technical question for which 
their special knowledge is deemed relevant. On the face of it, this would seem 
to be straightforward; in his job the scientist deals in facts, and here in the 
courtroom is just another set of facts to be discussed. Of course, it does not 
work that way. 
Active scientists know that the border between objective facts and 
subjective opinions becomes fuzzy as soon as the issue becomes interesting and 
hence contentious. There is no reason why the materials presented in the 
courtroom should always be more like those in the textbooks than those in the 
labs. Of course, the style of debate in the courts will be different from those in 
the different sorts of science; and this can indeed cause confusion. 
The research report is a highly stylized discourse, and its conventions are 
not easily translated to those of the courtroom. An active scientist accustomed 
to debating interesting and conflicted issues will recognize what is going on. 
Unlike the teacher, the active scientist does not deal with incontrovertible facts, 
but rather with inconclusive evidence and complex arguments. But there are 
important skills to be learned. Just how to manage the different sorts of 
qualifications of a statement respecting the strength of its own evidentiary 
support, its criticality for a larger argument, and the appropriate degree of 
generality in its claims, can be tasks for which experience of this new forum can 
be very important. Also, a research scientist might find quite serious difficulty 
in the new role of being paid directly for a statement. Although there is a whole 
body of discussion of the behavioral norms of the expert (thus, whether the 
expert serves the client or the court),30 it is well recognized that the situation is 
far from satisfactory.31 And finally, there are real problems of credentials. But 
for an active scientist accustomed to debate on interesting issues, the idea of 
introducing evidence, rather than laying down facts, should present no serious 
difficulty. 
The other sort of expert presents quite different problems. This expert is a 
professional, typically from a medical field, who may enjoy an academic 
appointment and whose professional standing depends in the last resort on 
superior judgment deployed in some clinical context. These unavoidable 
features of the professional role produce problems of low quality that are the 
exact opposite of those experts whose qualifications to testify are governed by 
 
 30. E.g., TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE (2004). 
 31. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR (1997). 
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.32 It is not a case of the courts 
excluding would-be scientific experts with dubious qualifications, but of 
accepting would-be professional experts whose eminence is bogus. 
This issue is a particularly sensitive one in England just now, following the 
suicide of a victim of professional malpractice in the courts.33 In 1999 Mrs. Sally 
Clark was convicted of the murder of her two children; after a lengthy stay in 
prison she was finally exonerated.34 But she never recovered from her ordeal, 
and she died in March 2007.35 In her trial, crucial evidence was given by 
Professor Sir Roy Meadow.36 Using his authority as a pediatrician to conceal his 
total ignorance of statistics, 37 he asserted that such a pair of sudden deaths had a 
chance of only one in seventy-three million.38 Sir Roy, who already had a 
reputation in connection with “Munchausen syndrome by proxy” (described in 
the House of Commons as “one of the most pernicious and ill-founded theories 
to have gained currency in childcare and social services in the past ten to fifteen 
years”)39 was subsequently struck off the medical register,40 later regaining that 
status through a lawsuit.41 There are other notorious cases of similar victims; 
many parents have lost their children through the (secret) family courts on the 
basis of “expert” evidence by such doctors.42 
Although the testimony of such experts is considered scientific, that term is 
really inappropriate. Needless to say, even worse is the use of professional 
expertise whereby witnesses are called on to make assessments that lie outside 
the categories of their science, such as psychiatrists passing on the ability of a 
defendant to distinguish right from wrong (the “M’Naghten Rules”).43 As the 
Sally Clark case shows, it is all too easy for a person to capitalize on 
professional eminence in order to indulge in specious scientific judgments in the 
courtroom. The correction of such abuses lies not in improved scientific 
methodology, but in improved accountability of the relevant professions. 
 
 32. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see HAACK, supra note 24, at 242–43 (“peer-review, a ‘known or potential 
error rate,’ and ‘widespread acceptance’—the so-called ‘Daubert’ factors” apply to the methodology of 
hypothesis-based expert opinions). 
 33. See Obituary of Sally Clark, Solicitor Wrongly Convicted of Infanticide Whose Ordeal as the 
Victim of a Miscarriage of Justice Became a Cause Célèbre, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 19, 2007, at 
25. 
 34. Minette Marrin, Sally Clark, a Mother Wronged to Death, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, 
at 16. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See News Release, The Royal Statistical Society, Royal Statistical Society Concerned by Issues 
Raised in Sally Clark Case (Oct. 23, 2001) (“The well-publicised figure of 1 in 73 million thus has no 
statistical basis.”). 
 38. Marrin, supra note 34, at 16. 
 39. Wikipedia.org, Sir Roy Meadow, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roy_Meadow (last visited Jan. 4, 
2009). 
 40. Marrin, supra note 34, at 16. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Clare Dyer, Family Courts’ Veil of Secrecy Will Lift to Win Back Public Confidence, THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/dec/05/broadcasting.politics. 
 43. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1001 (8th ed. 2004) (McNaghten rules). 
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C. Differences Between the Discourses: Facts 
An appropriate starting point for some of the differences between fields, or 
discourses, are those that may be less real than they seem. First, consider “fact.” 
One may imagine a naïve scientist (of whom there are still many) coming into a 
courtroom as an expert, expecting to retail his facts as they are relevant to the 
case. He may even have heard that the jury is a “trier of fact”—and he has some 
good ones to offer. Imagine his dismay when, instead of his facts being attended 
to respectfully, he is treated by counsel as just another witness, and perhaps 
even one whose testimony is rather confused and not quite clear or honest. He 
comes away bewildered and not a little bruised. No one had ever impugned his 
competence and integrity like this! He naturally wants to retreat to the lab, 
where colleagues are at least courteous to his face, and students deferential. 
This clash of illusions is worth exploring at some length. Both sorts of “fact” 
must be understood if the matter is to be sorted out. On the science side, the 
term “fact” should be used more sparingly than has hitherto been common.44 
The outputs of the problem-solving activity go through a complex and lengthy 
process of evolution after the lab books are closed. There is a “research report,” 
which will be scrutinized by referees for a journal (when the work is in the 
“open-source” sector of science) and which may, when modified, be published. 
Its status is then ambiguous; a leading article in a high-prestige journal will 
generally be accepted as probably correct, while the contents of low-prestige 
journals are assessed less generously if indeed they are even noticed at all. 
The story of the “fact” is only just beginning. In research science, that result 
lives on only if it stimulates some further research that will amplify, deepen, 
reinterpret, and (when appropriate) correct it. If the “item” survives this 
process, first by being interesting enough to be followed up and then remaining 
of interest after all the subsequent work, then at that point, and not before, is it 
justifiably called a “fact.” Even then its status is not absolute. If the field of 
inquiry in which it is embedded falls out of fashion or is superseded, that “fact” 
may die with it. In experimental fields, the equipment used to generate the 
underlying data, the physical parameters defining its operation, and the theory 
in whose terms the whole operation has meaning, may all be obsolete and 
forgotten. The item itself may then be either no longer of interest, or of little 
use, or just irrelevant to practice. Only those “facts” that survive all those 
vicissitudes of history and become “knowledge” can be truly “factual.” And 
then they become the materials of taught science, and are simplified or 
vulgarized for the benefit of immature minds. In those crude, usually confused, 
versions they stand as the symbols of genuine scientific knowledge, thereby 
both instructing and misleading us all for many generations. 
In the courts analogous patterns are discernable in spite of all the 
pronounced differences. We left the expert with his scientific information, 
which he had so fondly believed to be the facts of the case. For the court, that 
 
 44. See RAVETZ, supra note 8, at 181–208. 
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was just his testimony, which is introduced as evidence. In this respect, the legal 
procedure is actually more sophisticated than the scientific. For, when the 
material is considered as “evidence,” we know right away that it is context-
dependent and subject to assessments of quality in several dimensions. 
Furthermore, and here is the joke of the whole story, the “fact” of which the 
jury is the trier is not that particular item of scientific information, anyway. The 
“fact” is what the “verdict” is about. This will typically relate to a legal action, 
mixed as it is with its intention and its effects, and refracted as it is through a 
framework of law. Further, that item of scientific information in the case has a 
history, of how and by whom it was produced; its quality as evidence is strongly 
dependent on the details of that history. No matter how “objective” the 
information, if its production is seen to have violated the relevant laws of 
evidence, it is of no value in the argument of the case. 
And there can be a subsequent history in the courts, both of the “fact” 
embodied in the verdict and of the scientific information that functioned as 
evidence in its establishment. Although the processes of appeal are mainly 
concentrated on interpretations of the law, occasionally the scientific materials 
themselves come up for challenge and review. In English criminal procedure, 
the jargon is that when evidence loses too much strength on reexamination, the 
conviction becomes unsafe. In some celebrated cases, the status of convicted 
IRA terrorists changed suddenly when, after years of sustained work by 
solicitors, the terrorists were realized to have been unjustly treated.45 In some 
cases, the whole system of English criminal justice had been tainted by the 
corruption that was revealed retrospectively to have occurred.46 
D. Differences: Informality of Procedure 
As it happens, all those processes and judgments are carried out in all the 
other sorts of science. But in other sorts of science, colleagues in the same field 
proceed and judge largely informally, even to some extent unselfconsciously. 
An important part of the skill of managing scientific literature is knowing what 
can be safely ignored. Scientists must make instant rough judgments, based on 
author, funder (particularly if it is corporate food or pharma), sponsoring 
institution, and journal of publication. Doubtlessly, much worthy and 
worthwhile work suffers oblivion in this way, but some selection process, 
inevitably imperfect, is necessary. In this case it is done largely informally; there 
is no tribunal to which an aggrieved scientist can complain that he has been 
unfairly discriminated against when his publication has not received adequate 
recognition. In this way, the procedures for quality assessment and sifting in 
 
 45. See Craig R. Whitney, Faith in British Justice is Shaken by Forced Confessions and False 
Jailings, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1991, at 10 (“[T]he Government acknowledged that forensic tests had 
been flawed and misleading . . . .”). 
 46. See Kevin Toolis, When British Justice Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1990, at 32 (describing how 
one set of false convictions “tainted the entire British legal system” and “tarnished some of the loftiest 
legal and police reputations in England”). 
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science escape the tedium and the recursive traps of litigation on rules of 
procedure, but there is an obvious price to be paid. The dividing line between 
rebels and cranks is not always distinct. (Galileo himself straddled it.) The 
recursive questions of who decides on questions of legitimacy—how, and why, 
and to whom are they answerable, et cetera—can generally be left in an amiable 
fuzz, but only so long as the boundaries of science are uncontested in the polity. 
Two borderline cases serve to illuminate the real differences of concern 
here. The first is when scientists complain about their treatment as employees. 
The other case is closer to the situation in the courts. In regulatory science 
(particularly in the United States), recommendations for policy must be 
justified in a proper manner, for they are actually political in nature. The 
equivalent of due process applies, in various ways and to varying degrees. It has 
its costs, of course, in the length and inefficiency of the process, and also in the 
recursive levels of debate over the procedures. At those higher levels, the 
process can become highly politicized. Thus, the courts are not unique in having 
their difficulties with formalized rules of evidence and procedure. Whenever 
there is a requirement for the equivalent of due process, there will be all the 
problems and dilemmas of formality of procedure. 
This comparative study provides a context for analyzing the intervention of 
the courts in the assessment of scientific information. Of course, that assessment 
may sometimes appear to be both clumsy and misconceived. The decision in 
Daubert has been the subject of controversy ever since it was published.47 But 
such interventions are not always the result of judicial meddling in scientific 
issues. They are the result of necessity, the consequence of a genuine, key 
difference between ordinary research science and the courts. As in all products 
of design, either material or social, it is impossible to optimize on all 
characteristics. So, in the courts, fairness of procedures is achieved at the price 
of a growth of litigation and precedent about special sorts of “fairness,” which 
in turn reduces efficiency and even transparency. But, for example, if the 
alternative to Daubert were for judges to have chats with leading scientists in 
the respective fields for advice on whom to exclude, the situation would be 
worse. 
E. Science and Statistics in the Courts 
There does seem to be a great and unbridgeable divide between the courts 
and science at one point: the science itself. As is commonly known, the principle 
behind the jury of peers is that nothing relevant to the case is inaccessible to the 
ordinary person. And if (as has emerged in recent years) some genuinely 
esoteric knowledge is in play, then the jury is assumed to be able to treat the 
expert like any other witness and to evaluate the content of the expert’s offering 
 
 47. See, e.g., Alan E. Tamarelli, Recent Development, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: 
Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1195–99 (1994) (“Daubert’s idyllic 
general observations do not provide a manageable and consistent method for judging the admissibility 
of expert testimony.”). 
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in terms of the quality of his or her personal delivery.48 To many observers this 
must seem perverse. In the United Kingdom there have been calls to exclude 
juries from other sorts of trials in which technical issues are decisive, as in 
complex fraud cases.49 To ignore the chasm between the “common sense” of the 
courts and the esoteric technicalities of science could appear to be not merely 
imperfect, but quite fundamentally misguided. 
This pessimistic judgment admits two avenues of reply, which apply to 
different aspects of science as it appears in the courts. First is the content itself, 
which might appear totally incomprehensible to any but a small corps of highly 
trained experts. If these were the “facts” to be tried in the courts, the situation 
would be desperate indeed. But that is not what happens. The technical 
scientific materials are just part of the evidence, embedded into an argument 
(on either side) that eventually is (or is not) accepted as establishing the facts to 
be tried. And what counts in that material is not the intricate detail that is the 
object of research but rather those aspects that relate directly to the questions 
of the actions and intentions of particular people. Hence the materials that are 
adduced in the courtroom are those that are inherently easier to explain and 
popularize. The task of the scientific expert is thus analogous to that of the 
science teacher: not to expound on the most arcane details of current frontline 
research and controversy, but to render the more solidly established materials 
comprehensible to beginners and outsiders. 
Finally is the point where, apparently, no bridging at all can take place: 
statistical inference. We all know of the contortions participants in the judicial 
process are forced to undertake in order to make statistics amenable to inexpert 
minds and discourses. Confusion arises when scientific probabilities are 
translated into legal practice.50 And since “probability” is so central to the 
process of establishing the “facts,” this would seem to be a situation in which 
the courts really need science and in which juries really are incapable of 
assimilating it for effective use. 
An answer to this difficulty has two prongs, one obvious and the other 
rather less so. The obvious answer has been made by many jurists and 
commentators. The sense of “probability” invoked in the courts is different 
from, and much older than, the subject of the current mathematical theories. 
“Provability” has been a well-known concept in law and theology from 
medieval times onwards. Seen in this context, one of the most strange and 
fruitful moves in the Scientific Revolution was the assimilation of that rich 
concept of “provability” into games of chance. 
 
 48. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 114 (2002) (“There is no rule of law that 
requires controlling effect or influence to be given to the opinion testimony of expert witnesses.”). 
 49. E.g., David Barrett, Legal Matters: Jury Could Be Out for Good on Complex Cases, 
BIRMINGHAM POST, June 22, 2005, at 2. 
 50. See David W. Barnes, Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation, 64 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (Autumn 2001) (discussing differences between scientific and legal 
probabilities). 
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The less-obvious reply is one that draws on my own analysis of probability 
theory in the context of scientific reasoning. First, if anyone with sufficient basic 
mathematics and moral courage decides to master the theory of probability and 
statistics so that they can share in that clarity of reasoning, they are in for a 
shock. For although there are many formulas and computation systems that 
experts use routinely for the analysis of sets of data, their meaning turns out to 
be obscure and contested. The debates between “Frequentists” and Bayesians 
rival those of the Shia and the Sunni in their intensity. One sometimes gets an 
odd feeling on witnessing such arguments. Surely this is the sort of thing that 
should happen in the behavioral sciences, where things are inherently fuzzy, 
rather than in a mathematical science dealing with hard numbers. But it can 
happen here, and it does. 
A personal explanation for all this takes me to my own, perhaps eccentric, 
analysis of scientific argument. First, there is the failure of classical philosophy 
of science to explicate The Scientific Method, whereby scientists achieve truth 
in their demonstrations. Philosophers have come to see that scientific research 
is a messy affair; its methods are sort of reality therapy, offering no guarantee of 
truth or even of steady progress.51 And this is because as scientists penetrate 
ever deeper into the structure and workings of the world around us, even into 
matter in its less-complex organized states, they find not simplicity, but 
complexity and wonder. Experience and theory taken alone are either blind and 
empty respectively, or they interact in an intimate, everchanging dialogue. 
There was a time when some leading philosophers, and scientists too, 
believed that mathematics, the science of quantity and magnitude, was both 
fundamental and simple. From Descartes and Hobbes onwards, mathematics 
functioned as the exemplar of assured knowledge, which would lend its 
certainties to any natural science that was cast in its abstract language. But after 
a century of “foundational” studies,52 whatever the status of mathematical 
knowledge is, it is no longer simple and it had better not be fundamental! 
It could be that Probability & Statistics is now due for a similar critical 
examination. This analysis should be made available to outsiders who use, or 
who are used by, its reasonings. It seems this is a field of reasoning that could 
never be made clear, for it needs to treat human judgments and volitions in the 
terms of abstract formalisms and their algebraic combinations. (But I may be 
prejudiced!) What needs to be realized by both theorists and users is that they 
are all in the same boat: they are faced with a mass of very refractory material, 
reflecting the grapplings of the human intellect with things that are unknown 
and unknowable. Every sort of paradox and contradiction will appear there. 
Indeed, in its attempt to formalize patterns of reasoning, thereby preventing the 
fuzz and fudge whereby ordinary scientific argument works, Probability & 
 
 51. See HAACK, supra note 23, at 123–49. 
 52. Wikipedia.org, Foundations of Mathematics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations_of_mat 
hematics (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
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Statistics painfully expose all the underlying contradictions of our concepts and 
our inferences. 
This discussion may appear to claim that Probability & Statistics is 
inherently no more capable of total clarification than the common law. For 
some, that is a dismal prospect; but for others it may be a liberation. All the 
great, fruitful advances in statistical technique were made in the context of 
practice, when new ways of looking at numbers were needed. Their theoretical 
justifications, or rationalizations, came later. But when students and 
practitioners remain in ignorance of the practical roots of their discipline, it 
becomes fatally easy for them to have a merely manipulative understanding of it 
and to forget the need for the craft skills of quality control in its applications. 
Making real sense of sets of numbers is not achieved by pressing a few buttons 
on the SPSS package (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).53 Still less will 
such an approach resolve the issues of uncertain knowledge in the courts. 
This lengthy excursion was devoted to showing that there is no great chasm 
between the qualitative, complex reasonings of the courts and the supposedly 
clear and distinct logic of science as exemplified in Probability & Statistics. Of 
course there are difficult technicalities, and of course there are anomalies and 
paradoxes, both apparent and real. But, while outsiders (as those in the courts) 
look on, mystified by the formulas that seem to bear necessary truth, the 
insiders wallow in argument just like the practitioners of any other interesting 
discipline. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
What sort of conclusion can be drawn from all this? The differences 
between the conventions of scientific and legal settings are not so absolute as 
they may seem when science is viewed from the outside, and through a certain 
idealized image. Of course there are pronounced differences in procedure and 
etiquette, as there would be between any two large social institutions defined by 
quite different sets of societal functions. However opaque scientific reasoning 
may appear to the nonspecialists, it involves no special, truth-giving quality, 
least of all in Probability & Statistics. 
There is a more general concluding point, one that has actually motivated 
the writing of this essay. If science is governed by conventions that make it a 
perfect endeavor by honorable persons dedicated to the achievement of Truth, 
then it is extremely difficult to imagine how it could ever be misused and 
corrupted. Yet I am not alone in having witnessed, exposed, and analyzed the 
misuse and corruptions of science.54 It leaves one wondering whether there is a 
gap between an insider’s private, shared wisdom about the imperfections of 
 
 53. SPSS, Corporate History, http://www.spss.com/corpinfo/history.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 54. See, e.g., David Kriebel, How Much Evidence Is Enough: Conventions of Causal Inference, 72 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121 (Winter 2009). 
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science and an outsider’s official public image of science that assumes its 
perfections. It would appear that the Periclean vision of science, as interpreted 
in the Mertonian theory of four norms, still influences these images, in spite of 
the decades of demystification.55 Both the practices and the working norms of 
different forms of science are as diverse as their tasks and contexts. The 
boundary between science and the courts, while sharp in some respects, is by no 
means all smooth and linear. 
My own philosophy of science has had among its aims the elucidation of 
how science can indeed be misused and corrupted.56 It is a task of some delicacy; 
demystification and muckraking, once launched, cannot always be contained 
within the bounds of decorum and propriety. People will resent and resist the 
felling of their idols; and in their pain, when that happens, they may strike in all 
directions. Right now in the United States, we may be approaching the 
agonizing predicament of reformers in other spheres: whether, and then how, to 
defend worthy institutions from unprincipled attack when they may already be 
compromised and partly corrupted. Or one may wonder how to appeal to ideals 
of good behavior that may already be overtaken by hypocrisy and cynicism. 
These are difficult times indeed, and the problems of the use of science in the 
courts may not be the most salient of all just now. But, perhaps because it does 
lend itself to a detached analysis, this particular issue can show us how to 
achieve a synthesis of realism and idealism in the understanding and 
improvement of an important area of practice of science. 
 
 
 55. MERTON, supra note 10, at 267–78. 
 56. RAVETZ, supra note 8, at 418–22; RAVETZ, supra note 29, at 14. 
